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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the true legal answers and the prescriptive 
legal solutions for the Indonesian public accountant legal liability and how it is included in 
the audit report. 
Design/methodology/approach: This study applies the doctrinal method for examining the 
state asset management obtained from corporate criminal actions. 
Findings: Several provisions for public accountants in Indonesia, such as public accountant 
law and accounting standards, have become the legal standing of the corporate area 
disclosure on audit report, but it has never been applied. However, the scandals of corporate 
financial manipulation can drag the public accountants on legal issues for their liability in 
minimizing and preventing the fraud and for strengthening the corrective justice role of the 
audit report. 
Practical implications: There is a need for the empirical study to determine the effectiveness 
and the efficiency level for implementing the corporate disclosure on audit report. However, 
doctrinal research can be a comparison and can enrich empirical economic law for studying 
state asset management. 
Originality/value: The study initiates to renew the audit report framework in Indonesia such 
as the formulation of vicarious liability explicitly in economic law and to establish an 
independent board that oversees the quality of audit reports, and assesses the performance 
and accreditation of public accountants. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Accounting and financial manipulations committed by certain big corporations for 
certain illegal purposes show that almost all their financial reports had been audited 
by public accountants. Some international cases had proved it, such as: Enron, which 
was audited by Arthur Andersen. This had caused investors, employees, and 
shareholders a lost of US$74 billion; Waste Management, which was audited by 
Arthur Andersen, had reported false earnings amounting to US$1.7 billion; 
WorldCom, which was audited by Arthur Andersen, had marked up assets 
amounting to US$11 billion; and Lehman Brothers, which was audited by Ernst & 
Young, had disguised the loan as the sales amounting to US50 billion (Tuanakotta, 
2013). Arthur Andersen had been fined more than US$100 million in 2001 for audit 
problems concerning two clients, Waste Management and Sunbeam (Chaney and 
Philipich, 2002). Moreover, several US-listed foreign companies had scandals in its 
audited financial reports, such as Royal Ahold Corporation (a Dutch company) 
which materially misrepresented its financial results and performance, Nortel 
Networks Corporation (a Canadian company) which inflated the demand for its 
products, growth in revenues, earnings, and market, and Lernout & Hauspie Speech 
Products, N.V, a Belgian company) which made false and misleading statements. 
The scandals of several large companies, as its financial report have been audited, 
according to Soltani (2014) are the responsibility of public accountants. Based on the 
analysis of scandals of six audited corporates, namely, Enron, WorldCom, Royal 
Ahold, HealthSouth, Parmalat, and Vivendi Debacle, Soltani (2014) proved that the 
corporations as high profile lapses of accountability, lack of effective internal control 
mechanisms, and ineffective corporate governance structure, and the public 
accountants failed to maintain their independent conduct and made errors of 
judgement or created poor quality of audit. 
 
Considering recurring cases carried out in over several past decades have caused 
significant financial losses to the victims, the limitation of regulation in formulating 
the corporate liability in criminal law level, and the legal meaning of manipulation 
(of accounting and of financial) has been formulated in the Decision of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia Case Number 84/PUU-IX/2011 
(2011) as “an action based on bad intention to illegally take advantage for oneself 
or for other party based on adequate initial evidences, it is urgent to study 
doctrinally about the public accountant legal liability in revealing the corporate 
criminal intent or guilty mind (mens rea) on an audited financial report”. This 
background brings this article to focus on two main research questions. There have 
been several (comparative) research on the aspect of corporate actus reus, while 
attention for disclosing the corporate mens rea in corporate audit report as the public 
accountant legal liability has been rare. The existing researches are usually in 
separate focuses, between focusing on auditor legal liability and focusing on 
corporate liability. Two main research questions are; why public accountant must be 
legally liable to disclose the corporate mens rea and how are the implementation of 
the ideal corporate mens rea models on the public accountant report. 
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2. Public Accountant and Corporate Liability 
 
One of the most important pillars to account for and to communicate the company's 
performance to stakeholders periodically is financial statements as of financial 
information. Although some opinions state that financial statements cannot provide 
all the information needed by stakeholders, the purpose of financial statements must 
provide information regarding the financial position, performance, changes in 
financial position, and management accountability for the resources entrusted to it. 
Further, the information contained in the financial report must fulfill four qualitative 
characteristics, namely; understandable, relevant, reliable, and comparable (Institute 
of Indonesia Chartered Accountants, 2014). 
 
The independent and accountable public accountant liability must express the 
corporate audit results that meet the understandable, relevant, reliable, and 
comparable characteristics. The audited financial statements affirm that between the 
public accountant as the independent auditor and the corporation as the auditee there 
is legal liability if there is an unlawful act in the financial statements, considering 
that each legal subject not only attaches the sanctions due to the violations 
committed but also to what is thought or for whom it is done. This is closely related 
to understanding liability, which is inherent in two obligations. Obligations due to 
the propriety of doing or acting and obligations due to appropriateness tpo do not act 
(Sinaga and Sinaga, 2018), where the outcome is being responsible for the good and 
harm that resulted by an act against the law (Honoré in Ewing, 2015). Herein, the 
meaning of illegal acts is not only limited to acts that violate the law but also acts 
that violate moral, propriety, thoroughness and caution that should be owned by 
someone in social life. 
 
The relation between the corporate criminal liability who commits an illegal act in 
the scope of his business and the legal responsibility of a public accountant who has 
conducted an independent audit cannot be separated from the role of mens rea, as the 
fault element that establishes the “guilty mind” wrongdoer due to maxim actus non 
fit reus nisi mens sit rea (Chan and Simester, 2011) which must be clearly illustrated. 
This refers to some literature’s view about the public accountant legal liability in 
determining auditee crimes on the audited financial report. Such Acemoglu and 
Gietzmann (1997) explained that in practice there seems to be some disagreement 
about the optimal size of public accountant liability because it will affect the contract 
of public accountant and audited corporation. If the public accountant liability is too 
low, the independence of the public accountant is not credible and if the public 
accountant liability is too high, the cost of auditing to corporate will increase. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the important commitment mechanism in 
ensuring the public accountant's independence, including to make them credible and 
do not collude with the corporation, is still in terms of the imposition of potential 
legal liability (punishment). Then, Kassem, Rasha and Higson (2016) more 
decisively concluded that public accountant is responsible for detecting material 
misstatements arising from corporate crime, but this role was not clearly defined 
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relating to the limitations of audit standards. The firmness expressed by Kassem et 
al. (2016) also in line with Davison’s (1982) opinion which stated that public 
accountant as auditor will be safe as long as a corporate as auditee is relatively 
honest.  
 
However, no matter how strong the operational of auditee’s internal control system 
exists there will be opportunities to manipulate financial results, and the public 
accountant will inevitably look bad for the dishonest of the auditee. So, in solving 
this Davison (1982) suggested the public accountant issue an adverse or a disclaimer 
opinion concerning its liability is not only for performing its own negligence and 
fraud of its duty but also for detecting the negligence and fraud of others, even 
though this would risk client displeasure and/or dismissal. Then, in terms of risks 
and legal liability of public accountant, Willekens et al. (1996) stated that the risk of 
public accountants’ legal liability is of crucial importance, like the acceleration of 
litigation against auditors, and uncertainty over the scope and nature of auditors’ 
legal liability. However, although auditors may be found to have been criminally 
liable under some circumstances, due to the major focus on negligence conduct of 
auditors, the auditors be held liable on the civil liability area. This is based on the 
reason that the uncertainty about the legal standard of ‘due audit quality’, as 
fundamental in understanding audit quality supplied, only decreases the quality of 
audit work supplied. However, if the legal standard of care were clear, there would 
be no role for audit standards due to the role of audit standards only to influence the 
behavior of public accountants. 
 
It has been emphasized that corporate liability in a criminal act is supposed to more 
easily illustrated in the case that the corporate financial statements are audited by a 
public accountant because both of them have the respective responsibilities explicitly 
regulated. The existence of liability in which there are sanctions based on applicable 
laws and regulations shows that liability and sanctions are strongly related to the 
mens rea, which is the culpability principle refering to subjective mental attitudes as 
an important element in liability. As described mens rea as “connoting fault or 
blameworthiness of conduct, it should not be understood as synonymous with 
‘criminal intention’ or ‘wicked mind’” (The Malaysian Federal Court in Yeo, 
Morgan and Cheong, 2012). It can be said that the basic consideration of punishment 
is the deterrence of the offender who is only measured through mental statements 
that can be enforced, not based on actions or contributions in fulfilling a crime. The 
existence of such negligence is an entry point of understanding that not all parties to 
a crime are considered equally responsible, but are based on each individual who is 
considered guilty of all collective crime outcomes that refer to the reprehensible 
mental attitude that arises in the intention to take part (Steer, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, the proof of corporate mens rea is relatively very difficult, as Graycar 
(2016) revealed that the criminal behavior, by means of institutions, workplaces, and 
cultures, is part of the system in not only for many poor-countries but also surges 
certain developed countries, which shows that the problem of corporate mens rea lies 
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in the prevailing institutions, as a problem of collective action. The corporate abuse 
as tools of financial crimes engineering should be tackled in establishing trustworthy 
and impartial institutions (Rothstein, 2011) by proving the corporate mens rea, while 
the existing adequate models are the anthropomorphic models (also known as the 
derivative models) and the organizational models, as the necessary connection in 
constructing the scheme of liability for the organizational fault (Colvin, 1995).  
 
The next assertion due to corporate and individual liability within two models of 
corporate mens rea have been proposed by several scholars, such as Colvin (1995), 
Lord Denning (in de Maglie, 2005), de Maglie (2005) and Gobert (1994). Colvin 
proposed about the necessary connection between corporate and individual liability 
in constructing the scheme of liability for an organizational conduct and fault, which 
the scheme should construct the corporate mens rea into the derivative (or the 
anthropomorphic) and the organizational models. The understanding of 
anthropomorphic is based on the attribution of human characteristics to other 
creatures, as Lord Denning equates a corporation with a human body that has a brain 
and nerve center, which can control what it wants to do. Corporations are considered 
to have a hand that holds a tool and acting in accordance with instructions from the 
center, where core corporate management, such as the board of directors, are 
considered as the mind and will of the corporation that controls what needs to be 
done in the company. While agents or employees in the company mere servants and 
agents who are no more than hands to do work and who are considered to act, so 
they cannot be said to represent the mind or the will of the core corporate 
management. It means, the anthropomorphic models measure the corporate 
blameworthiness based on individual culpability, which are assumed that all legally 
or illegally conducted by core corporate management will be automatically identified 
as corporate activities. All the conduct of core corporate management are not as the 
corporate agents, but as the corporate itself. The related explanation about the 
anthropomorphic models expresses that the identification doctrine or the alter ego 
doctrine or vicarious liability is considered fulfilling the anthropomorphic models 
requirement, which indeed relates to derivatives of the individual liability (Colvin, 
1995). The anthropomorphic understandings which have been proposed by Colvin, 
Lord Denning and de Maglie, also in line with Gobert opinion which stated that the 
mental state (mens rea), which is deemed to justify a finding of blameworthiness of a 
corporation will be based on the offenses of one person that is attributed to 
corporation (Gobert, 1994) occurring in the course of corporation’s business.  
 
The shift to corporate’s liability is the other responsibility form of corporations to 
anticipate potential dangers and/or to prevent potential risks. The shift of liability 
from individual to corporate is based on several sides, like vicarious liability 
principle, identification theory, and aggregation concept (Gobert, 1994). Hereinafter, 
the organizational model is described by de Maglie (2005) as the implementation of 
the corporate criminal liability based on its characteristics, policies, and practices. 
Furthermore, Colvin (1995) elucidated the organizational model as the law of 
corporate criminal liability within fulfilling two fundamental frameworks. First, the 
          Ideal Corporate Criminal Liability for the Performance and Accreditation of Public 
Accountant Audit Report in Indonesia 
 456  
 
 
duty upon corporations toward their risk operations, structures, and resources that 
may cause harm or may be used to cause harm. Second, the corporate culture within 
the corporation must be of significance. 
 
3. Corporate Criminal Liability in Accounting Practice 
 
In believing the accountability, the truth and the appropriateness of financial 
statements information, an audit needs to be carried out. This is generally possible to 
be done in 2 audit forms, namely external audit, carried out by public accountants as 
independent double-check financial statements, and internal audits, which plays a 
role in determining the effectiveness and support of the organization's internal 
reporting system. Or in other meaning, in proving that the corporation is responsible 
for its assets, entities, procedures, or processes, the corporation must make the audit 
the central point of its accountability, as O'Reagan (2004) argued “without audit, no 
accountability, without accountability, no control, and if there is no control, where is 
the seat of power?”. Through periodically audits, especially for certain corporations 
that have been obliged to be audited by a public accountant, the public accountant 
must be responsible for the consequences of each audit that they do, as Article 26 of 
the Public Accountant Law asserts the liability of public accountant on their services. 
So that, Public Accountants must maintain their independence and must be free from 
conflicts of interest in providing audit services (Article 28 of the Public Accountant 
Law). The consequences of violating legal obligations for public accountant in 
Indonesia cause legal consequences, which have been strictly regulated in the form 
of administrative and criminal sanctions in Public Accountant Law. 
 
In Accordance with Article 53 of the Public Accountants Law, the administrative 
sanction is imposed on Public Accountants, Public Accounting Firms and/or 
branches of the Public Accountant Office. Such sanctions are recommendations to 
carry out certain obligations, warning letters, restrictions on the provision of services 
to certain entities, restrictions on granting certain services, freezing of licenses, 
revocation for licenses, and/or fines. Whereas Article 55 (criminal against Public 
Accountants) and Article 56 (criminal against Associated Parties) of the Public 
Accountant Law strictly regulate the criminal provisions for Public Accountant and 
Associated Parties who: (1) manipulating, helping to manipulate, and / or falsify data 
relating to services provided; or (2) deliberately manipulating, falsifying, and / or 
removing data or notes on working paper or not making working papers relating to 
services provided so that those working papers cannot be used properly in the 
framework of inspection by the authorized party. However, specifically for the 
Public Accountant Law who violates Article 55, they will be exempt from criminal 
charges if those actions have exceeded 5 (five) years from the date on service 
provision report. 
 
The command of law for public accountants  is to relies on audit result, to keep the 
independence, to meet on four qualitative characteristics requirement in audit report, 
and to meet the stakeholders interest on information that corporations disclose, on 
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the trustworthiness of the disclosure, and how the information is disclosed (Benston, 
et al., 2003) are the undeniable legal basis for public accountants compliance in 
conducting a corporate audit (Nasution, 2014). So that, the public accountant must 
comply the Professional Standards of Public Accountant of Indonesia (Standard 
Profesional Akuntan Publik-SPAP) as the measure of quality that must be obeyed by 
public accountants in the provision of services, as mandated under Article 1 point (1) 
of Association Regulation of Indonesian Institut of Certified Public Accountants 
(Institut Akuntan Publik Indonesia – IAPI) Number 3 0f 2017 regarding Professional 
Standards of Public Accountant. The SPAP is very concerned about fraud and 
compliance to regulation, so there are several important audit aspects that must be 
met, such as the implementation of risk-based audit, principles-based standard, and 
professional judgment and skepticism, the reduction of mathematics model 
approach, and the involvement of experienced and qualified auditors. 
 
Actually, this Indonesian SPAP is not as excellent as the newest audit standards of 
the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) in the United States or Europe. 
As in June 2017, the PCAOB adopted AS 3101 as a new audit reporting standard 
that change auditing from the culture emphasis to public service emphasis, which the 
primary goals are to make the auditor’s report easier to read, to assert the liability of 
auditor while conducting the audit, and to provide additional information to report 
users. In AS 3101, the auditors are required to discuss the so-called “critical audit 
matters” (CAMs) within their reports. According to Clikeman, the term CAMs in 
PCAOB is similar to the term of “key audit matter” in IAASB located within 
International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 701. CAMs, as defined in AS 3101.11, is 
“any matter arising from the audit of the financial statements that was communicated 
or required to be communicated to the audit committee and that: (1) relates to 
accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements and (2) involved 
especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment, while “key audit 
matters” disclosed in European audit reports include revenue recognition, 
recoverability of goodwill, loan loss reserves, and litigation provisions (Clikeman, 
2018).  
 
Further, Clikeman (2018) recommended the factors alone or in combination in 
determining whether an audit decision meets the AS 3101 criterion (1) the auditor’s 
assessment of the risks of material misstatement, including significant risks, (2) the 
degree of auditor judgment related to areas in the financial statements that involved 
the application of significant judgment or estimation by management, including 
estimates with significant measurement uncertainty, (3) the nature and timing of 
significant unusual transactions and the extent of audit effort and judgment related to 
these transactions, (4) the degree of auditor subjectivity in applying audit procedures 
to address the matter or in evaluating the results of those procedures, (5) the nature 
and extent of audit effort required to address the matter, including the extent of 
specialized skill or knowledge needed or the nature of consultations outside the 
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engagement team regarding the matter; and (6) the nature of audit evidence obtained 
regarding the matter. 
 
In carrying out the duties and liabilities in accordance with applicable provisions in 
Indonesia, the public accountant liability should concern some developed countries 
which have adopted the PCAOB and the IAASB that made a breakthrough in terms 
of audit reporting. It is supposed to be a legal obligation for Indonesian public 
accountants to disclose critical information about the mechanisms and procedures for 
the liability of the parties in the audited corporation which is a reflection of the 
depiction of corporate mens rea in an unlawful conduct. The urgency of mens rea, 
both to corporations and to public accountants in matters of unlawful conduct, shows 
that the implementation of liability will prevent, supervise, and evaluate of the 
unlawful objects, because the corporation as an auditee and the public accountant as 
an independent auditor disclose the obligation for its propriety to act or not to act. 
 
Indeed, the implementation of corporate mens rea has been criticized for the 
emergence of problems, both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, the 
problem refers to the absence of corporate facilities such as the characteristics that 
are owned by humans who deserve to have mens rea characteristic. While the 
practical problems related to the assumption of imposing the corporate mens rea that 
will hamper the work of regulation which forced to assess the legal behavior of the 
collection of people. However, the assumption about the problems of adopting 
corporate mens rea can be refuted concerning the variety of modern decentralized 
corporations, when handling the occur violations must be carried out as an integrated 
entity that must be attributed to corporations due to its impossibility to prove the 
guilty minds of the individuals in a corporation (de Maglie, 2005). Another 
supporting opinion is put forward by emphasizing the existence of a distinctive role 
played by corporations and individuals, which when reviewed against individuals 
will be obtained by the fact that the occurrence of individual violations is due to 
corporate coercion, both in forms of encouragement/support and/or tolerance, which 
are carried out in order to carry out and achieve the tasks set by the corporation. This 
corporate mens rea is the prerequisite of a corporation before bearing 
blameworthiness for the consequences of corporate conducts (Chan and Simester, 
2011). 
 
4. Corporate Mens Rea Formulation on the Public Accountant Report 
 
PERMA Number 13 of 2016, Regulation of General Attorney General Number 
PER-028 / A / JA / 2014, and several special laws have formulated the corporate 
criminal liability and its sanctions types. However, how to prove the corporate mens 
rea in terms of corporate liability, referring to the existence of a corporate obligation 
due to its appropriateness to act and its propriety do not act, still cannot be fully 
implemented in practice given the limited rules in corporate criminal law in 
Indonesia and the absence of existing corporate governance models, the 
anthropomorphic and the organizational models. The Article 4 paragraph (1) and (2) 
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of the PERMA Number 13 of 2016 embodies the legal standing of the corporate and 
/ or the corporate management mens rea in the form of certain corporate interests 
and corporate interests from the occurrence of the crime, the omission of a criminal 
act in the scope of the corporation, and the absence of the corporation in taking the 
appropriate precautions for avoiding or reducing the crime impacts. This Article 4 
paragraph (1) and (2) of the PERMA Number 13 of 2016 supposed to be reinforced 
through the existing mens rea proof models, the anthropomorphic models and the 
organizational models. Then it can be used as the strength of law enforcers to further 
prove the corporate crime. 
 
The implementation of the anthropomorphic model that should be based on certain 
doctrines, such as identification doctrine, alter ego doctrine, and aggregation 
doctrine, are the proper guidence to use vicarious liability in proving the individual 
unlawful acts as the basis of corporate criminal liability. The identification doctrine 
guideline base, alter ego doctrine, and aggregation doctrine as the right of vicarious 
liability refers to a general principle that transfers the core responsibility (or high) of 
corporate management to corporate governance, which is the corporate control and  
care towards its employees (Sinaga, 2017a). 
 
The following explanation describes the meaning of identification doctrine, alter ego 
doctrine, and aggregation doctrine which relates to vicarious liability. The 
identification doctrine shows the existence of one economic unit between 
individuals and their organizations based on existing interpretations or contracts, so 
that the rights and obligations of one party can be attributed to the other parties in 
the organization. Indeed, there can be problems with the interpretation of contracts 
or regulations in this doctrine in terms of the emergence of a legal problem whose 
purpose is to ignore and deny the corporate liability (Vandekerckhove, 2007\). 
While the alter ego doctrine is the reflection of vicarious liability or respondeat 
superior concerning the attribution of the mental state of high (or core) corporate 
management to the corporate mental state (Leigh, 1982) because of the occurrence 
of an illegal act carried out by high/core corporate management is inseparable from 
strong corporate dominance, including in financial issues, corporate policy, and 
corporate practical business (Bergkamp and Park, 2001\). When one or more high 
corporate core management commit illegal acts, those high/core corporate 
management are the corporate alter ego (Gómez-Jara Díez, 2011). Then, related to 
the aggregation doctrine, Hornman and Sikkema (2015\) categorized this doctrine as 
the combination of the derivative model and the organisational models that could 
provide a convincing theoretical foundation for corporate mens rea due to all the acts 
and mental elements of the various relevant persons within the corporation are 
combined, to ascertain whether in total they would amount to a crime if they had all 
been committed by one person. Hornman and Sikkema compared the aggregation 
doctrine with the ‘scraping together’ method due to the intentions of several 
individual employees that cannot be split up and divided amongst its members, so 
based on the corporate structure which serves as the frame upon the attitudes of the 
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participating individuals, these intentions are interwoven to form the corporate 
intentions. 
 
The challenges of the derivation of individual criminal liability through corporate 
management become corporate criminal liability as a form of the anthropomorphic 
model, are based on the argument that the management is not the corporation's 
"mind". However, Friedman (1979) argued that it is at least as part of corporate 
conscience which has the ability to authorize, to request, to command, to perform or 
to tolerate, which in general is a level of mens rea of several countries' criminal 
reasoning codes, such as Singapore which applies terms of intention, knowledge, 
rashness, negligence, dishonesty, fraudulently, and voluntarily (Yeo, Morgan and 
Cheong, 2012), or Australia which applies terms, knowledge, recklessness or 
negligence. Other opinions that represent core or high corporate management actions 
as a corporate act, among others, were stated by Bergkamp and Park (2001), Parker 
(1996) and several other countries although in other terms. Such as Australia and 
New Zealand terms with corporate "controlling officers" as the persons participating 
in the control of the corporation in the capacity of a director, manager, secretary or 
other similar officer (whether or not they were, or were validly, appointed to any 
such office position), and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code in the 
term “board of directors” or any "high managerial agent" as a person acting on 
behalf of the corporation (Colvin, 1995). 
 
Several opinions that represent the core (high) corporate management actions as 
corporate actions affirm that the anthropomorphic models in line with Indonesian 
penal code formulation which regulates that the perpetrator may only be punished 
based on the legality principle for the basis of crimes and on the fault principle the 
basis of punishability. It also means that based on the appropriateness and the 
reasonableness of the anthropomorphic models, both the legal entity and the human 
can be criminally liable jointly and/or independently as long as the person has the 
function in the organizational structure, or acts on behalf of corporate, or based on 
employment relationship in the scope of such corporate (Sinaga, 2017). 
 
The organizational models as more interventionist measures to control corporate 
externality-creating behavior were firstly proposed by Christopher Stone in his book, 
“Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior” in 1975. Stone 
initiated the corporate mens rea through public directorships and governmentally 
imposed internal corporate procedures, modeled on the organizational structure and 
procedures of corporate administrative agencies (Parker, 1996). In modern literature 
on corporate criminal liability, the use of organizational models in proving the 
corporate mens rea is clearer than the useful of anthropomorphic models. The 
organizational models have not been "personated”, as Friedman (1979) has 
examined its two major areas and other reasons are argued by Hornman and 
Sikkema (2015). 
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Contrary to the excellence of this organizational model, Hornman and Sikkema 
(2015) also criticized its difficulty to prove such organisational fault, for example, to 
relate the illegal acts conducts with the certain culture or unwritten rules and policies 
which existed within a corporation. The public accountant's legal liability to disclose 
the corporate mens rea in its audit report must be concise, brief and clear, especially 
regarding the details of the parties liable in the corporation, corporate characteristics, 
corporate governance policies and practices, corporate legal implementation and 
control, legal culture, constraints faced when audits were carried out, etc. Due to 
enthusiasm for tackling accounting and financial manipulation, as for fulfilling those 
four qualitative characteristics of financial statements and to meet the requirement 
on the accounting standards and SPAP, several ways are worth considering such as 
revealing non-financial information, as the performance measurements that are not 
expressed in monetary units, on the financial report. Indeed, the role of public 
accountants in providing nonfinancial information is still hotly debated, which refers 
to three main reasons, increased audit costs and increased litigation risk due to the 
broad scope of audits on non-financial information, the concern of auditor’s opinion 
on the financial statement, while the auditors supposed not be responsible for 
auditing non-financial measures is the potential to confuse financial statement users, 
the stakeholders are likely to become overwhelmed by the overloaded information. 
 
However, due to the obligation of auditor in understanding the measurement 
procedures, management practices, systems, and integrity of the third-party 
organizations, as long as it does not undermine the credibility of the audited 
financial statements, and due to prevailing rules and the rampant of misusing 
corporations as tools of financial crime, it must be a necessity to report non-financial 
information. The great benefits to stakeholders regarding to non-financial 
information disclosure on audit report had been released by PCAOB (Murphy and 
Hogan, 2016), in the form of the increased ablity in understanding the nature and 
scope of the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to the other information, the 
clarification as to what other information was evaluated by the auditor, and 
description of the results from the auditor’s evaluation of other information. There is 
also a form of accumulating the evidence in the form of testimonial evidence, 
documentation evidence, physical evidence, and personal observations to make sure 
whether is there an element of fraud in the financial statements of a corporation and 
Building an independent board that insist on maintaining high audit standards, on 
enforcing of accounting standards (Benston et al., 2003), on controlling of public 
accountants’ performance, and on evaluating of public accountants’ accreditation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The description of corporate mens rea models on the public accountant report has 
never ben applied even though there are several provisions, such in the Public 
Accountant Law, in the SPAP, and in the accounting standards, which become the 
legal standing of its implementation. Although public accountants could be 
criminally liable under some circumstances, the uncertainty about liability rules on 
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audited financial report, both to the public accountant and the corporation, the 
uncertainty about liability rules on audited financial reports, both of the public 
accountant and the corporation, are one of the causes of the widespread accounting 
and financial manipulation for the unlawful act's purpose. Significant changes are 
needed in the audit reporting system which can anticipate intentions to unlawful 
conduct, from the repressive actions to preventive actions, by disclosing the non-
financial information critically in the audited report.  
 
The non-financial information which reveals the anthropomorphic and the 
organizational models must be briefly and clearly revealed, including the disclosure 
of details of the parties responsible for the corporation, the characteristics, policies, 
and practices in corporate governance, implementation, and control of corporate 
legal culture, constraints faced when audits are carried out, etc , which are 
reflections for facilitating the corporate mens rea verification when problems arise. 
In this case, it can be evaluated more easily on public accountants who really have 
carried out their duties and liabilities independently. With the disclosure of the non-
financial information on the audit reports, positive results for public accountants 
were obtained such the stronger independence and integrity as well as better levels 
of prudence and expertise, while the positive results for corporations are to 
anticipate potential dangers and/or prevent potential risks related to unlawful acts. 
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